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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to delineate new similarities and future differences between
legal systems, using pre-contractual liability and good faith. Instead of focusing on the
differences between common law and civil law, we focus our attention on the gap
between Europe, England included, and United States. All over Europe, under the
influence of good faith jurisprudence, duty to inform has been extremely broadened.
Contemporary debate confirms that European Legal Academia overemphasizes the
importance of the quest for central common principles of European private law, like
Good Faith and obligation de renseignement, and ignores questions regarding cost-
benefit effects of disclosure, parties informational rent seeking and general policy
considerations. A stereotyped legal doctrine, concentrating on the influence of EU
directives on national legal system and, in some cases, unification as a forthcoming
national-positive law can create an undesirable effect in the creation of future case law.
The author wish to thank the International Center for Economic Research (Torino), together with McGill University
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1. Introduction
The recent American debate
1 about the limits of pre-contractual reliance provides the
opportunity to recall some European and Comparative Law notes.
Are we dealing here with an area of law where western legal systems substantially differ
from each other as far as both general evaluations and specific results are concerned?
This inquiry appears to be all the more important since both the Principles of European
Contract Law as proposed by the “Lando group”
2 and the Principles of International and
Commercial Contracts as published by UNIDROIT
3 contain certain general provisions
according to which “each party must act in accordance with good faith and fair
dealing”.
The purpose of this article is to delineate new convergent similarities and future
possible differences between legal systems, using pre-contractual liability and good
faith as a focal point of investigation
4.
The first part of the article tries to reframe the ordinary picture of Good Faith in
European contract law.
Western legal systems differ as to the scope of the good faith principle. In the Civil Law
system, the minimalist view is represented by the French courts, who have not relied on
the bonne foi to the same extent that their German and Italian counterparts did. An even
more minimalist approach is represented by the common law of England does not
recognize any general obligation of the parties to a contract to conform to the standard
of good faith.
The second part of the article focuses the prism of the good faith investigation by
concentrating on the pre-contractual duty to inform and by trying to map reciprocal
influences, and differences between Europe and United States.
2. The Principle of Good Faith in Europe
a. French law
“The contract is law between the parties” (art.1134 c.c.).
This seems to be the main concern of French contract law; such a declamatory
5
principle forced French legal literature to find creative ways to impose good faith duties
against the party freedom of contract
6.3
The alinéa n.3 of art.1134 c.c. then states that “les conventions doivent être executées de
bonne foi”, art.1135 c.c. adds that “la convention oblige à toutes suites que l’equité
donne a l’obligation d’après sa nature”, the Obligation Section of the French civil code
does not contain other explicit references to the good faith principle.
The French scholars, though, starting from the late seventies expanded the number of
situations where the good faith principle applies
7:
1) in the Formation of contract the parties must deal in good faith; the freedom of
contract principle, thus, is limited by the good faith principle. French jurisprudence,
anyway, looks for a very substantial deviation from pre-contractual reliance in order to
establish a basis for liability in tort (art.1382 c.c.) or for a classical situation of deceit
(artt.1110, 1116 c.c.);
2) in the Performance of contract there are at least two main applications of the Good
faith principle: the Duty of Loyalty
8 and the Duty of Cooperation
9.
a) The Duty of Loyalty, according to the Cartesian tradition is divided into two
cathegories:  obligation de moyens and obligation de résultat, in the latter case the
débiteur must obtain the exact goal foreseen by the agreement between the parties quite
apart from good faith evaluation, while the créancier must avoid any behavior imposing
the performance difficulties.
In case of an obligation de moyens the débiteur has to accomplish his obligation simply
by acting with due care, as that of a “bon père de famille”.
b) The Duty of Cooperation too is divided into two different applications: the utmost
good faith contracts (contrat de societé, de travail, d’assurance) and the duty to disclose
(obligation précontractuelle de renseignement).
 The French bonne foi, even if strengthened by the doctrinal efforts, is still weakened by
the judicial suspicion of introducing valeurs d’équité. The perceived danger is the risk
of too broad judicial discretion in spite of the Positive Law traditional French
approach
10.
Moreover both the French doctrine and courts are not making a clear distinction
between subjective and objective good faith (the German Guter glaube and Treu und
Glaube), particularly in the context of cooperation cases, such as réticence dolosive,
erreur sur la substance
11.4
b. German Law
The contractual obligations according to German law, are subject to the standard of
“good faith”. This has been read both by doctrine and courts into a seemingly rather
marginal provision  (§ 242 BGB), which relates specifically to the manner in which the
obligation is to be performed.
§ 242 BGB has thus, by way of interpretation, been transformed into one of the famous
“general clauses”
12 by means of which Germany’s “case law revolution” was effected
13.
It has provided a convenient starting point for countless new doctrines and for the
modification of old ones
14, and innumerable cases
15 as it has been employed to avoid
“harsh or inequitable results”
16.
Over the years much criticism has been leveled at the excessive proliferation of
equitable inroads into established legal principles
17. On the other hand, however,
consensus has emerged over a whole range of legitimate applications of the principle of
good faith.
The efforts of academic commentators (starting with an influential study by Franz
Wiaecker
18) have established much to domesticate legal categories of cases as they are
listed in any modern commentary sub §242 BGB.
Those doctrinal efforts of categorizing have become so firmly established that they are
seen today as forming an indispensable part of the legal landscape.
§242 BGB says that the recipient must perform her/his obligation in good faith
according to trade usage.
Both doctrine and case law implemented the use of the good faith paragraph in order to
devise a remedy for the following code gaps:
1) in spite of the existence of § 242
19  there is no provision in the BGB dealing with
culpa in contrahendo;
2) there is no provision protecting the recipient from a partial or incorrect performance;
3) last but not least, there is not a general principle of neminem laedere (general tort of
negligence) in the German civil liability provisions (§§ 823 ff. that protects individuals
against damages to life, body, health, property); there is no room to expand tort liability
to protect some pre-contractual, contractual or post-contractual situations.
In order to protect the parties in those situations and avoid harsh or inequitable results,
scholars have pointed to typical situations where the good faith “general principle” must5
be enforced
20. The late development in this trend is to avoid any use of the §242 BGB as
an equitable remedy and lately there seems to be a strong reluctance to admit any new
applications of the doctrine
21.
The first group of standard types is listed under the label of contract ancillary duties
(duty to inform, duty to protect, duty of precise performance); then follow the venire
contra factum proprium principle, the “abuse of its own right” and the “tacit
renunciation” (forfeiture of right, especially by laches); and lastly the “rebus sic
stantibus” principle and the “contractual basic assumption” (Voraussenzung) doctrine.
In order to see how those principles work we can take as an example the rules on
Positive Vertragsverletzung (duty of precise performance): the judge must look if the
contractual duties are implicated (Schuldverhaltnis), and then evaluate which required
ancillary duty violated, and finally decide if there is negligence.
c. Italian law
The Italian 1942 Civil Code has been drafted in an epoch when Italian scholars were
fully aware of German case law on paragraph 242 of the BGB
22. Therefore the Italian
Code highlights the importance of “good faith” in the contractual relationships in
several code articles: art.1366 “Contract must be interpreted in good faith”, art.1375
“Contract must be executed in good faith”; art.1175 “Debtor and creditor must behave
according to good faith and fair dealing rules” and finally, article 1337 provides that
“parties must behave in good faith during the pre-contractual bargaining and contract
drafting”.
Modern Italian contract law scholarship
23, after  the 1942 Code, has rejected the concept
that an actual, subjective meeting of the minds is necessary to form a contract, in favor
of a theory protecting parties reasonable expectations in relying on promises and
communications
24.
According to the latter approach the buona fede principle has been interpreted by
scholars as a synonym of German Treu und Glaube even if the Italian case law
25 seems
still to place a lot of importance on the idea that the parties enter into a bargaining
process under the principle of freedom of contract.
Until the beginning of the seventies the main stream of the Supreme Court of Cassation
held that the good faith provisions did not offer an autonomous ground for a legal6
action
26. Those articles were to be used by courts only to strength the protection of a self
standing diritto soggettivo (fully recognized legal title)
27.
In the late seventies, under a vehement doctrinal debate
28, the case law changed to
recognize the buona fede principle as an autonomous basis for a cause of action. As is
usually the case, the courts chose to develop the doctrine by focusing on certain types of
cases, which include:
1) The right to organize special form of strikes;
2) Labor law contractual relations; and
3) The duty to inform and the duty to protect the other party interest
29.
A 1975 decision by the Milan Court of Appeal
30 considered the violation of art.1375
c.c. an autonomous ground for action in tort, pursuable by art.2043 c.c. (the Italian
provision for tort liability: the neminem laedere principle).
The Italian scholars are skeptical about the usage made by courts of the good faith
principle in as much as it could be used for redistributive purposes; some of them
31 are
worried about the temptation to use it as a general equitable principle, a solution that
might vest too broad discretionary power in the judge hands.
On the one hand the Italian doctrine has not been able to offer the judges a clear
systematic picture of good faith standard situations
32; on the other, the Italian doctrine,
until the late seventies was strongly influenced by the German doctrine, and clashed
with Italian judges still influenced by the French doctrine and courts. This cultural
incommensurability
33 is now posing a difficult problem of conflicting theories about
good faith and culpa in contrahendo
34.
d. English law
There is no general positive duty of good faith imposed on the parties to a contract in
the English law today
35. English merchant law, indeed, recognized the principle until
the disappearance in the XVIII century of the Admiralty
36.
The utopian  idea of the common law is that manners in business are oriented by a
“rough and tough” rule and according to this rule Courts are used to take a fairly
extreme position on the duties of the parties to look after themselves and to stay, so to
say, “on their own feet”
37.
The rule of equity, still sound and alive in the English law of remedies, offered
protection against the most harsh and tough situations. It is not by chance that the7
equitable remedy of Promissory Estoppel has turned from being a shield into being a
sword
38 and can offer adequate protection against promise revocation or unjust
withdrawal from negotiations.
During the period that one author called the Decline of Freedom of Contract (1870-
1980)
39 English law started to stress some pre-contractual duties between the parties,
and to elaborate new doctrines that could be easily brought under a good faith
heading
40.
One after the other a certain number of contractual relations has been added by good
faith special duties.
Beside the uberrimae fidei contract (like in French law: insurance, company), that have
always required an utmost duty of good faith, fiduciary relationships in general provide
several instances of duties that in the civil law world would be related to the good faith
principle.
Family and professional-client relations (special relation or good faith relation) require a
duty of good faith and full disclosure.
Like in France, Legal duties may arise between negotiating parties in tort: parties may
owe duties of care to each other
41.
The English courts are offering remedies to the party claiming a breach of good faith
duties, indeed they prefer to do it without referring to a general principle, which
apparently seems to create a problem regarding the predictability of the legal outcomes
of cases
42.
There are many cases in which English courts are reading “implied terms” into a
contract, adopting a standard of interpretation similar to the anti-formalistic approach
used by continental courts in good faith cases.
The absence of a general duty of good faith, can probably be best described as an
illustration of English attitude to see the law as a self standing domain and a world
distinct from business and politics. Judges do not like to wield the power to determine
whether the parties have acted in good faith or not
43.
Jane Stapleton writes that even if English lawyers do not call it good faith they believe
in the need for legal doctrines that seek to temper the deliberate pursuit of self-interest
in situations where the conscience is bound
44.8
3. The duty to inform and the Good Faith principle within European legal systems
The French bonne foi, the German Treu und Glaube, the Italian buona fede e correttezza
and the English good faith situations are not synonymous; they are phenotypes of a
broader genotype offering the legal professionals a way out from the harshness of the
strict application of the rules of contrat, Vertrag or contract. They all call for some
judicial discretion in the name of fairness.
A recent contribution about the need of a good faith principle within a future European
civil code suggest there is no need of such an undefined and broad principle
45.
Within this general frame and this narrow common core
46 of general principles the
inquiry has to proceed by focusing on a narrower list of factual situations.
I choose to investigate factual situations where a duty to disclose is involved for two
reasons: first some systems see the duty to inform as a specific problem of the general
principle of good faith; second it is
The main objective of the second part of this study is to examine one specific problem
related to the Good Faith principle - the duty to inform - from a comparative prospective
and to point out the differences between the common law and the civil law in treating
this problem.
My comparative analysis of the duty to inform covers France, Germany, England and
Italy, as well as the United States
47. All these systems impose certain limitation on the
duty to inform.
Consider Cicero’s classic example
48 - recalled by Saint Thomas Aquinus
49 - of the
starving Rodhians who meet the Egyptian merchant first landing on the island after
passing other triremes full of corn.
This example is still debated. Is the merchant under an obligation to disclose the
information about the arrival of other ships?
There are many modern examples: does a trader have to reveal to a buyer that the
leading tobacco port, now  closed because of a naval blockade, is going to open soon?
50
Does the owner of a house have to disclose to the buyer that the house is badly infested
with termites?
51
Does a franchiser have to disclose to a franchisee his intention to withdraw from
negotiations? When does he have to tell it in order not to be considered liable for
frustrating the franchisee’s expectations?
529
Do I have to tell the buyer of my company shares that the main project of the company
is going to be more expensive than what I have foreseen?
53
We can continue with many other possible examples and all of us can think of solutions
our respective legal systems can offer.
It is important to recall some of the possible solutions in all systems:
mistake – erreur;
fraud – dol;
culpa in contrahendo - promissory estoppel;
presupposizione – Voraussetzung.
Legal Theorists all over Europe, under the influence of the German Treu und Glaube
Prinzip, are at the stage of developing new interpretation of those solutions according to
the good faith principle.
Let’s focus our attention on the differences.
Instead of focusing on the differences between common law and civil law, I propose
that we focus our attention on the gap between Europe, England included, and the
United States.
All over Europe, under the influence of good faith jurisprudence the duty to inform has
been extremely broadened:
Following  the intuition of de Juglart and the work of Muriel Fabre Magnan and Jacques
Ghestin, French scholars call the duty to disclose obligation d’information
54 and French
courts are now applying it as a matter of course
55.
Rodolfo Sacco’s
56 and Giovanna Visintini’s
57 works are gradually influencing the
Italian Courts to pay attention to the reticenza dolosa (misrepresentation) as a possible
trigger of contract voidability and reliance damages recovery
58.
Jane Stapleton’s re-mapping of the English law demonstrates that the good faith
principle and the duty to inform are no longer continental institutions
59. Significantly,
she criticizes the Gunter Toebner
60 idea that good faith is a legal irritant evidencing the
incommensurability between common and civil lawyers.
Even if I consider the Gunter Teubner idea extreme, and even if I do not agree with the
oversimplification of the two conceptions of capitalism: the Anglo-Saxon and the
Continental, Colbert against Adam Smith, I do have to draw your attention to the fact
that the most important and recent differences between American and European10
theoretical approaches to the duty to inform are at the doctrinal level, and this fact,  I
predict may generate further differences in the future.
In Europe we are close to a strong assimilation of the ways of solving factual situations
concerning the pre-contractual duty to inform implying the use of good faith as a
general principle
61.
I do believe that the European Legal Academia overemphasizes the importance of the
quest for the central common principles of European private law, like Good Faith and
obligation de renseignement, and ignoring questions regarding the cost-benefit effects
of disclosure, parties informational rent seeking and general policy considerations.
A stereotyped legal doctrine, mostly concentrating on the influence of the EU directives
on national legal system and, in some cases, unification as a forthcoming national-
positive law can create an undesirable effect.
There is a chance that the European legal culture starts again to derive a dogmatic
approach instead of a critical prudentialistic one, boxing legal theory into an Ivory
Tower disconnected from real world. There is a deep cultural gap between Europe,
England included, and the United States.
The doctrinal German idea of Treu und Glaube has captured American legal thought in
the 1920’s and 1930’s
 62, and started to affect legislation and case law in the United
States.
Terms like reliance, good faith, duty to inform pervade State legislation, the various
Restatements and the Uniform Federal legislation, principally the Uniform Commercial
Code.
The Uniform Commercial Code, strongly influenced by Karl Llewellyn, who was
extremely familiar with German law, reveals the unstated influence of various civil
codes.
UCC §1-203 states that “every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of
good faith in its performance or enforcement … the good faith is a basic principle
running through this Act”.
Moreover, §205 of the Restatement (Second) on Contracts, inspired by the uniform
commercial code, declares that “every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good
faith and fair dealing in its performance and enforcement”.11
However, when some authors like Summers, Farnsworth and Kessler
63 were telling us
the history of the acceptance of the good faith principle and the related duties within the
American legal system, something happened and overturned the easy prediction of a
complete harmonization of the American and  Continental Europe Contract Laws.
The anti-positivistic, anti-formalistic and anti-dogmatic gene, Legal Realism, had
already vaccinated American legal thought against some of the most pernicious cultural
diseases of the Old Continent.
Since the seventies the American legal scene, once occupied by legal realism, has been
captured by two new movements: Law and Economic and Critical Legal Studies.
Both movements, even though they disagree on almost everything, launched a lethal
attack to the prudentialist tradition of the legal scholarship
64.
Anthony Kronman and Mary Ann Glendon
65 are describing this change as the end of the
Lawyer Statesman Paradigm and the birth of a kind of, let me suggest, Super Lawyer,
strongly committed to many scientific disciplines.
The Super Lawyer is studying Economics instead of Roman Law, Sociology instead of
Legal History
66.
The economic analysis of law changes the perspective of the investigation about the
duty to inform from fairness and justice to efficiency: when disclosure could thwart
efficient results Law and Economics opposes disclosure and vice versa.
The Critical Legal Studies changes the prospective of the investigation about the Duty
to Inform from fairness and justice to an ideological struggle between people in
different cultural, race, gender and economic positions
67. Each of these interpretations
and/or adjudication is protecting different desired results
68. The Duty to disclose does
not mean anything until information is in the hands of economic or political élites.
My point is that Europe and United States, at the doctrinal level, are now divided by
different theoretical ways of addressing legal issues: prudentialism still means
something in Europe (England included)
69.
European Scholars, not enough influenced by the Legal Realism, are too devoted to
classification. Few authors perceive the importance of meta-legal perspectives to
understand social and institutional changes affecting legal matters
70.
The Rodolfo Sacco
71 school of Comparative Law and the Norbert Rouland
72
Anthropology of Law are offering, within civil law academies, different perspectives.12
They adopt, indeed, a “choice for candor”
73: setting aside the systematic and dogmatic
paradigms and looking for historically and anthropologically founded meanings. Both
schools are pretending no involvement in political discussion about the opportunity of
the different solutions
74.
Although criticized, Gunter Teubner  and his “Autopoiesis School”, within its affinity to
Sociology, is one of the few European legal authors trying to provide a critical
contribution, open to different scientific domains, analyzing legal institutions from the
point of new of the modern society
75.
European Academia too keen on the normative analysis loose ground in favor of the
American Academia. In general the result is a wider and wider distance between the two
sides of the Atlantic Ocean and chances for new one way legal transplants, which,
probably, have already started. In Italy, for example, we take part in a syncretic
experiment, conducted by some authors, who are using comparative methodology, law
and economics and critical arguments in order to launch innovative perspective within
national legal doctrine
76.
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